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Abstract
Using actual probabilities of audit and penalty rates, the return on evasion is
91-98 percent. So why don’t most of us evade? Existing analysis, based on expected
utility theory (EUT) is unable to explain this. Furthermore, and contrary to intuition
and the bulk of evidence, EUT predicts that evasion should be decreasing in the
tax rate (Yitzhaki puzzle). We apply Kahneman and Tversky’s (1992) cumulative
prospect theory to tax evasion. We show that prospect theory provides a much more
satisfactory account of tax evasion including an explanation of the Yitzhaki puzzle.
This also provides independent confirmation of prospect theory.
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1. Introduction
Why do people pay taxes? Theoretical work, largely based on expected utility theory
(EUT), has struggled to cope with the stylized facts. The tax evasion puzzle goes some-
thing like this. The (average) audit probability, p, is extremely low, with realistic magni-
tudes ranging from p = 0.01 to p = 0.03, while the penalty rate, λ, that is paid in addition
to the payment of the evaded tax liabilities, ranges from 0.5 to 2.0; see, for example, Alm
et al. (1992), Andreoni et al. (1998) and Bernasconi (1998). The seminal applications of
EUT to the tax evasion problem, by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974),
show that the taxpayer will choose to evade taxes if the expected return per pound on
evading the tax, 1 − p − pλ, is positive. Using observed values of p and λ, the expected
return on tax evasion is between 91 and 98.5 percent. The EUT account of tax evasion
contradicts the empirical evidence in several ways. We focus on the following four.
1. With a positive expected return to tax evasion, EUT predicts that all taxpayers
should hide some income. Taking account of unintentional mis-reporting of income,
the evidence is that about 30 percent of taxpayers evade taxes; for instance, see
Andreoni et al. (1998) and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002).
2. To square the predicted extent of tax evasion under EUT with the evidence, tax
payers should be risk averse to an absurd degree; see, for example, Skinner and
Slemrod (1985) and Alm et al. (1992)1.
3. Yitzhaki showed that using EUT under the reasonable assumption of decreasing
absolute risk aversion, an increase in the tax rate leads to a decrease in tax evasion. In
a large majority of the cases, experimental, econometric and survey evidence rejects
this result. See, for example, Friedland et al. (1978), Clotfelter (1983), Baldry
(1987), Andreoni et al. (1998) and Pudney et al. (2000). A notable exception,
however, is Feinstein (1991).
4. Obligatory advance tax payments should not influence the taxpayer’s evasion deci-
sion under EUT. This is because the carriers of utility under EUT are final wealth
levels that are unaﬀected by the obligatory advance payments. However, empirical
and experimental evidence show that obligatory advance tax payments reduce tax
evasion; see, for example, Yaniv (1999).
Can the EUT framework be modified in some manner to take account of the tax evasion
puzzles (1) - (4)? One possibility is that the stigma associated with being caught evading
1In one example, Skinner and Slemrod report a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) of 70 for
EUT while realistic magnitudes of CRRA lie between 1 and 5.
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taxes might make taxpayers reluctant to evade, despite the existence of a favorable gamble;
see, for example, Benjamini and Maital (1985), Gordon (1989) and al-Nowaihi and Pyle
(2000). Whether stigma can overturn tax puzzles (1) and (2) above is an empirical ques-
tion. We find, in our calibration exercises, the answer to be in the negative. Furthermore,
even the introduction of stigma does not address the tax puzzles (3) and (4) above.
The Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki model has been extended in a number of directions to
include endogenous income, dynamic eﬀects, social norms, tax avoidance and uncertainty
in the outcome of audits, among others; see, for example, Andreoni et al. However, as
long as EUT is retained, the above paradoxes remain. Therefore, much recent work has
investigated several non-EUT frameworks.
Bernasconi imposes a technical restriction on preferences called “orders of risk aversion”
based on earlier work by Segal and Spivak (1990)2. It turns out that for realistic (p, λ)
pairs, if risk aversion is of order 2 then tax evasion will take place, but if it is of order
1 it might not. However, not all technical restrictions on preferences are founded on
independent empirical evidence, and, hence, it is not easy to evaluate their plausibility for
specific contexts and for actual behavior; see for example, Starmer (2000).
Rank dependent expected utility theory (RDEU) can be viewed as EUT applied with
a transformed cumulative probability distribution. This is of tremendous utility, since the
whole machinery of risk analysis in EUT can be transferred to RDEU. This is Quiggin’s
correspondence principle (Quiggin 1993). In particular, a decision maker under RDEU
will never chooses a first order stochastically dominated prospect.
Although RDEU can solve some problems of EUT (e.g., the Allais paradox), it cannot
solve others (see, for example, problems 11 and 12 in Kahneman and Tversky 1979). More-
over, Eide (2001) showed that the paradoxical comparative static results of the Allingham-
Sandmo-Yitzhaki model carry over to RDEU. We therefore turn to a more radical depar-
ture from EUT: cumulative prospect theory (CPT).
1.1. A note on prospect theory
Prospect theory is based on the following five main ideas: reference dependence, declining
sensitivity, loss aversion, non-linear weighting of probabilities, and susceptibility to framing
eﬀects. Unlike EUT where the carriers of utility are final levels of wealth (or incomes or
commodities), under prospect theory the carriers of utility are gains and losses relative to
some reference point. Declining sensitivity means that the utility function is concave in
the domain of gains and convex in the domain of losses. Loss aversion is based on the idea
that losses are more salient than gains. Given an amount of money, x > 0, and a utility
2For a certain class of gambles, orders of risk aversion imposes restrictions on the first and second
derivatives of the risk premium term with respect to the tax rate.
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function, v(x), (to be specified precisely below) loss aversion implies that v(x) > −v(−x).
Agents facing uncertain situations overweight small probabilities but underweight large
ones. Finally, agents’ preferences are influenced by the way a problem is presented. There
is a substantial body of evidence in support of these building blocks of prospect theory;
see, for instance, the collection of papers in Kahneman and Tversky (2000).
Prospect theory has been successfully used to explain a range of puzzles in economics,
such as the disposition eﬀect, asymmetric price elasticities, elasticities of labour supply
that are inconsistent with standard models of labour supply, and the excess sensitivity of
consumption to income; see, for example, Camerer (2000).
An important application of prospect theory is to the equity-premium puzzle in fi-
nance, which is similar in spirit to the tax evasion puzzle in that both can be formulated
in terms of a similar portfolio choice problem. The equity premium puzzle asks the fol-
lowing question. Why are annual real rates of return on stocks, relative to bonds, about
6 percent higher since 1926 when the standard deviation for the two investments equals
0.2 and 0.0 respectively? Using EUT, it is diﬃcult to make sense of this apparently high
premium on stocks unless individuals have coeﬃcients of relative risk aversion in excess
of 30, which is unrealistic3. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) successfully use prospect theory
to explain the equity premium puzzle based on loss averse agents who are also myopic in
the sense of having limited planning horizons. An obvious parallel with tax evasion is to
imagine evasion and compliance as two competing investments and ask why people invest
disproportionately large amounts in the latter when returns on the former are so high.
1.2. A brief literature review of tax evasion using prospect theory
There is already a literature on the application of prospect theory to the tax evasion
problem. The experimental studies of Alm et al. suggest that one possible explanation for
why people pay taxes might be based on prospect theory. They conjecture that taxpayers
might be using a non-linear transformation of probabilities to overweight the probability
of a tax audit, which provides an obvious deterrent to tax evasion activity. However, they
do not attempt to formalize their suggestion.
A number of papers apply prospect theory to the tax evasion problem in an attempt
to analyze the role of “advance tax payments” in deterring tax evasion; for instance, see
Yaniv (1999) and Elﬀers and Hessing (1997). This literature typically uses a restricted
prospect theory model that, like EUT, is based on objective probabilities but incorporates
reference dependence and loss aversion4. To see the intuition behind these models, suppose
3Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) calculate that a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion of 30 implies that the
certainty equivalent of the prospect - win 50,000 or 100,000 each with probability 1/2 is only 51,209. This
is an absurdly high degree of risk aversion.
4The use of “choice heuristics” in this literature (for instance, see Yaniv), to combine common terms in
3
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that the advance tax payments exceed actual tax liability. In this case, by correctly
reporting income the taxpayer gets a refund, a gain. Under prospect theory, the taxpayer’s
utility function is concave for gains. On the other hand, if the advance tax payment were
lower than actual tax liabilities, then by subsequently reporting additional income the
taxpayer would owe taxes to the government, a loss. Under prospect theory the taxpayer’s
utility function is convex for losses5 and thus might be more willing to take the gamble of
evading taxes. Therefore, the level of obligatory advance tax payments can complement
the deterrence ability of the tax authorities.
Bernasconi and Zanardi (2004) apply cumulative prospect theory to tax evasion by
considering a “general” reference point. There are two states of the world, ‘income is
audited’ and ‘income is not audited’. In their setting, it is possible for the tax evader to
be in the domain of gains or in the domain of losses in both states of the world (see Figure
4.1). In these two cases, as Eide showed, the paradoxical comparative static results of the
Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki model carry over to RDEU. Therefore, the only interesting
case is that in which the tax payer is in the domain of gains if not caught but in the
domain of losses if caught. In this paper, we show that this will be the case if, and
only if, the reference point is the legal after-tax income. Hence, we argue the case for
a “unique” reference point. Our paper also diﬀers from theirs in several other respects.
First, they use a special case of prospect theory where probabilities are transformed as
in RDEU. According to Prelec (1998), this is empirically rejected. On the other hand,
our application of CPT is standard. Second, they use a fixed probability of detection
while we allow the probability of detection to depend on the amount of income evaded.
Third, we introduce stigma costs of evasion. Fourth, using parameters estimated by the
experimental literature, we show that relative to EUT, prospect theory provides a much
better explanation of tax evasion.
1.3. Our paper and results
The main objective of the paper is to see if it is possible to resolve the tax evasion puzzles,
1-3 above, using prospect theory6.
Stigma from the detection of tax evasion is recognized as an important factor in the
tax evasion literature within the EUT framework; see, for example, Skinner and Slemrod
income arising in diﬀerent states of nature is not consistent with the cumulative prospect theory model of
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) that we use in our paper. It instead draws its inspiration from an earlier
version of the prospect theory model due to Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
5In prospect theory, the attitude to risk is more complex than under EUT, being the result of the
interaction of the shape of the utility function, loss aversion and the non-linear weighting of probabilities.
This is summarized by the fourfold pattern of attitudes to risk in Tversky and Kahneman.
6The tax evasion puzzle (4) is readily explained using prospect theory. Since this has already been
done, for example, by Yaniv, we do not address this question any further. It can, however, be incorporated
within our framework.
4
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(1985), Gordon (1989), Besley and Coate (1992). We integrate stigma from tax evasion
within a prospect theory framework. Including stigma does not change the comparative
static results of our model, but it allows us to predict the level of aggregate tax evasion.
Furthermore, we show that the introduction of stigma within EUT does not enable it to
resolve tax evasion puzzles 1 and 2, above.
Our results show that EUT, applied to tax evasion, provides several misleading qual-
itative as well as quantitative predictions that are refuted by the data. Furthermore, the
predictions of prospect theory are consistent with the evidence. Using calibration exercises
we show that the main quantitative problem with an EUT analysis of tax evasion is that it
vastly over-predicts the extent of tax evasion. In contrast, the predicted extent of evasion
under prospect theory is consistent with the evidence. The main qualitative problem with
an EUT analysis of tax evasion is that it provides a misleading account of the eﬀect of
the tax rate on the amount evaded (see the Yitzhaki puzzle above). We show that under
prospect theory, an increase in the tax rate is predicted to increase the amount evaded,
which is in agreement with the bulk of the evidence. Furthermore, our calibration results
show that under EUT the Yitzhaki puzzle remains even in the presence of stigma.
In conjunction, these results strongly suggest the superiority of prospect theory over
EUT as a framework in the policy analysis of tax evasion.
Convexity of the value function for losses is the most important element of prospect
theory for the explanation of the Yitzhaki puzzle. However, the other elements, loss
aversion and non-linear weighting of probabilities, as well as stigma, all play their part
in arriving at a good empirical fit. It is important to note that we do not select our
parameter values to get a good fit. Quite the contrary; the parameters of our model come
from independent experimental evidence, unrelated to the specific problem of tax evasion.
When such parameters are not available, we conduct an extensive robustness analysis of
our results. Thus, our paper argues, on the one hand, that prospect theory can provide a
satisfactory explanation of tax evasion, and, on the other hand, also that the phenomenon
of tax evasion provides independent confirmation of prospect theory.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model. Section 3
considers tax evasion under EUT. Section 4 considers tax evasion under prospect theory.
Section 5 calibrates the models under EUT and prospect theory, and Section 6 undertakes
a robustness analysis of the results. Finally, Section 7 concludes. All proofs are collected
in the appendix available on the JEBO website.
2. The model
A taxpayer has exogenous taxable income W > 0 and can choose to declare some amount
D ∈ [0,W ]. The government levies a tax on declared income at the constant marginal
5
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rate t, 0 < t < 1. If the taxpayer evades (0 ≤ D < W ), then he is caught with probability
p (D) ∈ [0, 1]7. We assume that p (D) is continuously diﬀerentiable and p0 (D) ≤ 0 (i.e. the
taxpayer is more likely to be caught if he evades more). That the probability of detection
may depend on the amount evaded is quite familiar from the tax evasion literature within
the EUT framework; see, for example, Slemrod and Yitzhaki. However, to the best of our
knowledge, this is the first paper in the prospect theory literature to allow the probability
of detection to depend on amount evaded.
If caught, the dishonest taxpayer must pay the outstanding tax liabilities t(W −D), a
penalty λt(W −D) where λ > 0 is the penalty rate on evaded taxes and also suﬀers some
stigma s(W −D) where s is the stigma rate on evaded income8. There is a continuum of
individuals with stigma rates s ∈ [s, s] with density φ(s) and distribution function Φ(s).
Denoting by YC and YNC , respectively, the income of the taxpayer when he is "caught"
and when he is "not caught",
YNC =W − tD, (2.1)
YC = (1− t)W − (s+ λt) (W −D). (2.2)
3. Tax evasion under expected utility theory
Assume that the taxpayer has a strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice continuously
diﬀerentiable utility function, u (Y ). His expected utility is
U (D; t, s, λ,W ) = p (D) u (YC) + [1− p (D)] u (YNC) . (3.1)
Since U (D; t, s, λ,W ) is a continuous function of D on the non-empty compact interval
[0,W ], it attains a maximum at some D∗ (t, s, λ,W ) ∈ [0,W ].
7There are two issues regarding p (D). First, the audits carried out by the tax authorities need not be
random. Andreoni et al. mention that for the US, the IRS assigns each tax return a “score” based on
a “discriminant function”. However, because the score and the discriminant function are strictly private
information to the IRS, thus, from the perspective of the taxpayer, her return is randomly audited. Second,
for a significant percentage of the population, income taxes are withheld at source, so tax evasion is not
an option for them. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that this applies to half the population. In that
case the eﬀective probability of audit doubles for taxpayers whose income is not withheld at source. In
the US, for instance, where the probability of an audit is about 1.5 percent (see Andreoni et al.) the
eﬀective probability of an audit is then about 3 percent and possibly no more than 5 percent (see Skinner
and Slemrod). Our simulation results compare EUT and Prospect Theory for probabilities in this range.
8As in Gordon (1989) and Besley and Coate (1992), such stigma enters linearly, as a monetary equiv-
alent, into the payoﬀ in that state of the world. Stigma costs could arise from factors such as social
sanctions and the eﬀect on one’s current and future earnings arising from being a tax evader. We discuss
issues about the magnitude of stigma, a more general formulation of stigma, and "guilt" that might arise
from the act of evasion in Section 5
6
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Proposition 1 Under EUT,
(a) At a regular interior optimum, tax evasion is strictly decreasing in the punishment
rate (per dollar of evaded tax), λ, and the stigma rate (per dollar of concealed income), s.
(b) At an optimum on the boundary (D∗ = 0 orD∗ = W ), tax evasion is non-increasing
in the punishment rate (per dollar of evaded tax), λ, and the stigma rate (per dollar of
concealed income), s.
(c) However, the eﬀect of a change in the tax rate, t, on tax evaded is ambiguous.
The result that tax evasion is decreasing in the punishment rate and the stigma rate
is in agreement with intuition and evidence9. However, extra assumptions are needed to
determine the eﬀect of a change in the tax rate on tax evaded, which we turn to next.
3.1. Yitzhaki’s puzzle
Proposition 2 Assume that the probability of detection is independent of the amount
evaded, so p0 (D) = 0. Also assume no stigma (s = 0) and non-increasing absolute risk
aversion. Under these conditions, EUT predicts
(a) At an interior optimum an increase in the tax rate, t, causes a reduction in tax
evaded.
(b) At an optimum on the boundary (D∗ = 0 orD∗ = W ), tax evasion is non-increasing
in the tax rate, t.
This result was first obtained by Yitzhaki. The intuition can be given by imagining
evasion and reporting as two distinct activities. With λ > 0, evasion becomes more
expensive, relative to non-evasion, as t increases. However, an increase in t reduces the
income of the taxpayer. With constant or declining absolute risk aversion, this induces the
agent to reduce the risky activity (i.e. evasion). Hence, on both counts evasion falls with
an increase in the tax rate. On the other hand, the bulk of empirical and experimental
evidence, some of which is reviewed in the introduction, is suggestive of the contrary eﬀect
(i.e. evasion increases as taxes increase10).
4. Tax evasion under prospect theory
From Proposition 1 we saw that, at a quite general level, expected utility theory fails to
predict the direction of the response of tax evasion to a change in the tax rate. Under
the more restrictive assumptions of Proposition 2, expected utility theory makes a definite
9If labor income is endogenous, then λ impacts the eﬀective wage rate. Because the wage rate has
opposing income and substitution eﬀects on labor supply, the eﬀect is no longer unambiguous; see Andreoni
et al.
10Recall point 3 of the introduction.
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prediction, but this prediction is rejected by the bulk of the empirical evidence. We now
show that prospect theory makes the empirically correct comparative-static predictions,
namely, that the amount of tax evaded declines with a rise in the punishment and stigma
rates, λ and s, respectively, and increases with an increase in the tax rate, t.
4.1. Utility of an outcome under prospect theory
Let R be the reference income of the taxpayer, and let the income relative to this reference
point be
Xi = Yi −R (4.1)
where i = C or NC denotes the two states "caught" and "not caught". As in Tversky
and Kahneman, the utility associated with a gain or loss Xi is v(Xi), and
v(Xi) =
½
Xβi if Xi ≥ 0
−θ(−Xi)β if Xi < 0
(4.2)
where β ∈ [0, 1] and θ > 1 are preference parameters and v is called the value function.
Tversky and Kahneman stated that the power form given in (4.2) arises from the axiom of
preference homogeneity11. The parameter θ is the parameter of loss aversion; it encapsu-
lates the basic idea that a loss of x dollars is more painful than the pleasure derived from
a gain of x dollars. Based on experimental evidence, Tversky and Kahneman suggest that
β u 0.88 while θ u 2.25.12 The graph in Figure 4.1 is sketched for β = 0.5.
4.2. The reference point under prospect theory
Although prospect theory does not provide suﬃcient guidance to determine the reference
point in each possible situation, in several cases there can be a plausible candidate for
a reference point. Indeed, specifying a suitable reference point is often essential for a
successful application of prospect theory.
We take the legal after-tax income as the reference point in this paper, so
R = (1− t)W. (4.3)
This has the implication that if the taxpayer evades but is not caught, then she finds
herself in the domain of gains. On the other hand, if she evades and is caught, then she
11Consider a lottery (x1, ..., xn; p1, ..., pn) that gives prize xi with probability pi. Preference homogeneity
requires that (x1, ..., xn; p1, ..., pn) ∼ y⇒ (kx1, ..., kxn; p1, ..., pn) ∼ ky, where∼ is the indiﬀerence relation.
12As in other areas of economics, specific functional forms and parameter values are needed for calibra-
tion exercises. The functional form given in (4.2) is consistent with experimental evidence, and has an
axiomatic basis. The values for θ and β are drawn from a wide range of experimental evidence unrelated
to the problem of tax evasion.
8
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Figure 4.1: Preferences Under Prospect Theory
finds herself in the domain of losses13.
We justify (4.3) as follows. If the taxpayer is always in the domain of gains or always
in the domain of losses, then CP reduces to RDEU. But Eide showed that the paradoxical
comparative static results of the Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki model carry over to RDEU.
Therefore, the only interesting case is that in which the tax payer is in the domain of gains
if not caught but in the domain of losses if caught. Proposition 3, below, shows that this
will be the case if, and only if, the reference point is the legal after tax income (4.3).14
Proposition 3 Suppose that for all l vels of declared income, D ∈ [0,W ], a tax payer
is in the domain of gains if not caught, XNC ≥ 0, but in the domain of losses if caught,
XC ≤ 0. Then the reference point must, necessarily, be R = (1− t)W .
13There is an old adage in public finance that says that "an old tax is a good tax". An even stronger
version of this adage is that “an old tax is no tax”; see, for instance, Bastable (1892, Book III, Chapter
VII.18) or Needham (2002, p6). What these adages imply is that the current legal tax liabilities are
“salient” in the sense of providing an individual with a focal or a reference point. Hence, a tax cut would
be coded as a gain while a tax increase would be coded as a loss.
14As pointed out by a referee, it is suﬃcient that the taxpayer is in the domain of gains if not caught
and in the domain of losses if caught for the actual level of declared income. However, to guarantee that
this is the case, we have assumed that it holds for all possible levels of declared income.
9
Page 10 of 30 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
4.3. The probability weighting function
There is considerable empirical evidence that people overweight low probabilities but un-
derweight high probabilities; see, for example, Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Tversky
and Kahneman (1992) and Starmer (2000). We take a probability weighting function to
be a strictly increasing function, w (p), from [0, 1] onto [0, 1]. Hence w (p) is continuous
with w (0) = 0, w (1) = 1. We assume that w (p) is diﬀerentiable on (0, 1). At a general
level15, the probability weighting function for gains, w+ (p), need not be the same as that
for losses, w− (p). We illustrate in Figure 5.1 an example of a specific weighting function,
due to Prelec.
4.4. The tax evasion decision under prospect theory
Recall that our reference income is legal after-tax income (4.3): R = (1− t)W . Hence,
from (4.1), XNC = YNC − (1− t)W and XC = YC − (1− t)W . Then, using (2.1), (2.2)
and recalling that 0 ≤ D ≤W , we get
XNC = t (W −D) ≥ 0, (4.4)
XC = − (s + λt) (W −D) ≤ 0. (4.5)
Hence, the taxpayer is in the domain of losses if caught but in the domain of gains if not
caught. Let v be the taxpayer’s value function and w+, w− be her probability weighting
function for the domains of gains and losses, respectively. Then, according to cumulative
prospect theory, the taxpayer maximizes16
V (D; t, s, λ, θ,W ) = w− [p (D)] v (XC) + w+ [1− p (D)] v (XNC) . (4.6)
Comparing (4.6) with the analogous expression for expected utility theory, (3.1), we see the
following diﬀerences. First, the carriers of utility in prospect theory are gains and losses
relative to some reference point rather than levels. Second, one uses decision weights
in prospect theory to aggregate outcomes while one uses objective probabilities under
expected utility theory. From (4.2), (4.4), (4.5) and (4.6) we get
V (D; t, s, λ, θ,W ) = [t (W −D)]β w+ [1− p (D)]− θ [(s + λt) (W −D)]β w− [p (D)] .
(4.7)
Letting
h (D; t, s, λ, θ) = tβw+ [1− p (D)]− θ (s+ λt)β w− [p (D)] , (4.8)
15We are grateful to a referee for reminding us of this.
16Bernasconi and Zanardi set w+ (1− p) = 1 − w− (p). However, to quote from Prelec (last line of
Appendix A): “CPT reduces to RDU if w− (p) = 1 − w+ (1− p). Empirically, however, one observes
w+ (p) = w− (p).” Therefore, in our calibration exercises, we shall take w+ (p) = w− (p).
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we get that (4.7) can be written in the following form:
V (D; t, s, λ, θ,W ) = (W −D)β h (D; t, s, λ, θ) . (4.9)
Since V (D; t, s, λ, θ,W ) is a continuous function on the non-empty compact interval [0,W ],
it attains a maximum at some point D∗ (t, s, λ, θ,W ) ∈ [0,W ].
Proposition 4 Under prospect theory,
(a) At a regular interior optimum, tax evasion is strictly decreasing in the punishment
rate, λ, the stigma rate, s, and the coeﬃcient of loss aversion, θ. However, tax evasion is
strictly increasing in the tax rate, t.
(b) At an optimum on the boundary (D∗ = 0 orD∗ = W ), tax evasion is non-increasing
in the punishment rate, λ, the stigma rate, s, and the coeﬃcient of loss aversion, θ.
However, tax evasion is non-decreasing in the tax rate, t.
Comparing Proposition 4 with Proposition 1, we see that both EUT and prospect
theory predict the empirically correct comparative static results for a change in λ and s.
Furthermore, an increase in loss aversion under prospect theory reduces the taxpayer’s
payoﬀ when caught, hence reducing the incentive to evade.
While EUT fails to predict the direction of change in the amount of tax evaded when
the tax rate changes (see Proposition 1), prospect theory predicts the empirically correct
result.
Furthermore, under the conditions of Proposition 2, EUT predicts the empirically
wrong result (the Yitzhaki puzzle) while, from Proposition 4, we see that the empirically
correct result is predicted by prospect theory. The intuition is that when a tax evader is
caught, he finds himself in the domain of losses. Under prospect theory the value function
is convex for losses. It follows that an increase in the tax rate causes the taxpayer to be
poorer and, hence, more risk seeking, so he evades more.
5. Model Calibration
What accounts for the high degree of tax compliance when actual (λ, p) combinations are
such that 1− p− pλ > 0? To answer this question, it is useful to start with the following
question. Given actual magnitudes of tax evasion in the population, what combinations of
(λ, p) are required to sustain that level of evasion? Since the weighting function in prospect
theory is highly non-linear, analytical answers are not possible. Hence, the analysis below
provides simulation results in a calibrated model.
Most, if not all, calibration exercises in tax evasion use a fixed probability of detection;
see, for instance, Skinner and Slemrod (1985) and Bernasconi (1998). The reason is that
11
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one does not know the exact shape of the probability detection schedule. In keeping with
this practice we adopt, in this section and the next, the assumption that the probability
of detection is fixed. This could be viewed as a simplifying modelling procedure on our
part17. Alternatively, it could be viewed as an assumption about the behavior of taxpayers.
In the absence of concrete information on the shape of the probability detection schedule,
a taxpayer may decide to treat the probability of detection as fixed. We summarize
the results of our model with a fixed detection probability. Details of derivations and a
diagrammatic exposition can be found in Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2005).
5.1. Model results with a fixed detection probability
5.1.1. Expected Utility Theory
To facilitate comparison with prospect theory, take U(Y ) = Y β when Y ≥ 0 and U(Y ) = 0
when Y < 0. Diﬀerentiating (3.1) gives
∂E[U ]
∂D
= −tβ(1− p) [YNC ]β−1 + pβ [tλ+ s] [YC ]β−1 (5.1)
where YC and YNC are defined in (2.1) and (2.2) respectively. The second order condition
can be easily checked to be satisfied. Hence, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for the
maximization of expected utility in the region YC > 0, is given by
∂E[U ]
∂D
≥ 0 for D =W (5.2)
∂E[U ]
∂D
= 0 for 0 < D < W (5.3)
∂E[U ]
∂D
≤ 0 for D = 0. (5.4)
If the taxpayer does not evade (D = W ) then YC = YNC = W − tD > 0 and, hence,
(5.1), and the first row of (5.2) apply. In particular, ∂E[U]∂D ≥ 0 gives −t(1−p)+p [tλ+ s] ≥
0 and, hence,
λ ≥ 1− p
p
− s
t
. (5.5)
In (λ, p) space, (5.5) gives the set of (λ, p) points such that a taxpayer with stigma
s ∈ [s, s] reports the full amount of income. At all points below this set, the taxpayer
chooses to evade some strictly positive fraction of income. From (5.2) - (5.5) it can be
checked that at D = W there exists some critical value of stigma sc such that
λ(p) =
1− p
p
− sc
t
. (5.6)
17Even in macroeconomics where calibration is most prevalent, despite the non-linearities it is usually
the simplified log-linearized version of the model that is used in the calibration exercises.
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From (5.2) - (5.4) and (5.6) it can be checked that
∂EU
∂D
< 0 for s < sc;
∂EU
∂D
= 0 for s = sc;
∂EU
∂D
> 0 for s > sc. (5.7)
We summarize this result below.
Proposition 5 There is some critical level of stigma sc, defined by the relation λ(p) =
1−p
p −
sc
t , such that if s ≥ sc then D =W . For any s < sc, D < W .
In the absence of stigma costs (i.e. s = 0), (5.5) implies that the taxpayer will evade
some fraction of income when
1− p− pλ > 0,
as claimed in the opening paragraph of the introduction.
Solving (5.3), the interior solution to the declared income is given by
D = W
⎡
⎣1− (1− t)
"
(tλ+ s) + t
µ
(tλ+ s)p
t(1− p)
¶ 1
1−β
#−1⎤
⎦ . (5.8)
All the usual comparative static results under expected utility can be checked directly
from (5.8).
5.1.2. Prospect Theory
Putting a fixed detection probability in (4.8), we get that
h (t, s, λ, θ) = tβw+ (1− p)− θ (s + λt)β w− (p) . (5.9)
Hence, (4.9) can be written in the form
V (D; t, s, λ, θ,W ) = (W −D)β h (t, s, λ, θ) . (5.10)
Since the value equation in (5.10) is monotonic in D, the solution is
Case-I: D = 0 if h > 0 ⇒
¡
1
θ
¢ w+(1−p)
w−(p) >
¡
λ+ st
¢β
Case-II: D ∈ [0,W ] if h = 0 ⇒
¡
1
θ
¢ w+(1−p)
w−(p) =
¡
λ+ st
¢β
Case-III: D = W if h < 0 ⇒
¡
1
θ
¢ w+(1−p)
w−(p) <
¡
λ+ st
¢β
.
(5.11)
The solution to the tax evasion problem under prospect theory, when the probability of
detection is fixed, is a bang-bang solution. We would argue that the bang-bang solution
seems descriptive of several forms of tax evasion that take the form of hiding certain
activities completely from the tax authorities while fully declaring other sources. For
instance, an academic might not report income arising from an invited but paid lecture.
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A school teacher might not report tuition income for after-school lessons. A householder
might pay cash to a builder for a minor extension of the house. Line item reporting of tax
returns might further encourage this behavior. This bang-bang implication of reporting
taxable income can also be drawn from the experimental results of Pudney et al. (2000).
Slemrod and Yitzhaki find, based on TCMP data for 1988, that “the voluntary reporting
percentage was 99.5% for wages and salaries, but only 41.4% for self-employment income”.
Additional support comes from the behavior of non-profit organizations whose profits from
activities unrelated to their primary tax exempt purpose are subject to federal and state
tax. The reporting behavior of such organizations is suggestive of the bang-bang solution;
see Omer and Yetman (2002).
Define
sc = t
∙
w+(1− p)
θw−(p)
¸1/β
− tλ. (5.12)
From (5.11) the following result is obvious and we state it without proof.
Proposition 6 Ceteris-paribus ∃ s = sc ∈
£
s,
_
s
¤
, such that, when s > sc, where sc is
defined by (5.12), the taxpayer declares the full amount of income, while in the comple-
mentary case, all income is evaded.
5.2. Parameter Values for Calibration Results
From estimates in Tversky and Kahneman we know that β ≈ 0.88 and θ ≈ 2.25. We
use a tax rate of 30 percent (i.e. t = 0.3). From Andreoni et al., we know that in actual
practice about 40 percent of taxpayers report their incomes incorrectly in the US18; see
also Bernasconi. Since these figures include those who unintentionally report incorrectly,
we use the more conservative estimate that only about 30 percent evade taxes.
While most parameters necessary for the calibration exercise are readily available, the
incorporation of stigma in calibration exercises is less than straightforward. Evidence sug-
gests that the stigma arising from tax evasion is of a very small magnitude; for instance, see
Brooks (2001). There are several possible reasons for this. First, information on the iden-
tity of tax evaders is not usually in the public domain; hence, social ostracization is likely
to be small. Second, individuals might feel relatively more guilty about cheating other
individuals as compared to the government, which can be perceived to be an inanimate
entity19. Third, stigma is likely to be felt only from events arising in the future. Thus, in
18Citing evidence from TCMP (taxpayer compliance measurement program) data, Andreoni et. al.
mention that for 1998, 40 percent of US households underpaid taxes. It is estimated that about 7 percent
of the households unintentionally underpaid, so approximately a third of the households evade. A quarter
of all households underpaid by $1500 or more.
19Experimental evidence indicates that the subjects of ultimatum game experiments exhibit a much
greater regard for others (70-30 splits are not uncommon) relative to the predictions of economic theory.
14
Page 15 of 30 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
an appropriate dynamic game (which we do not model), if individuals have current-biased
preferences, they are likely to underweight these future costs (over and above that arising
from normal exponential discounting)20.
While the general view seems to be that stigma costs from evasion are low, we are not
aware of the exact magnitudes. Some evidence is available from stigma costs that arises
from claiming welfare benefits. Pudney et al. (2002) find that the total stigma costs (which
they define as stigma, hassle, search costs, etc.) come to no more than £2 - £4 per week,
where the average benefit level in the sample is about £21 per week. As a percentage of
welfare benefits, stigma costs range from about 10−20 percent.
We assume that the stigma rate from the detection of tax evasion is distributed uni-
formly over the unit interval (i.e. s ∈ [0, 1]). Several factors motivate this choice. First,
stigma costs from the detection of tax evasion are likely to be larger than those arising from
welfare benefits. Even if we allow for the maximum stigma rate to be up to 5 times higher
(relative to the maximum that arises from the receipt of welfare payments), its magnitude
is still less than 1. Second, restricting s to the domain [0, 1] allows for the stigma rate to
be interpreted as a “social tax” from engaging in illicit activity that lies between one and
a hundred percent. Third, we perform a robustness analysis of the stigma rate below that
bears out our results.
From Propositions 5 and 6, we know that all individuals characterized by s > sc do
not evade taxes while all those with s < sc evade taxes. Given s ∈ [0, 1], the stylized fact
that approximately 30 percent of taxpayers evade taxes corresponds to
sc = 0.3, (5.13)
which is the value we shall use for the calibration exercise.
5.3. Calibration Results
We ask the following question. Given realistic magnitudes of tax evasion (i.e. 30 percent),
how close are the predicted λ, p values under EUT and prospect theory, respectively, to
their actual values21?
Under expected utility, using Proposition 5, (5.13) and the calibration values specified
above, the locus of (λ, p) combinations that need to be consistent with the actual data is
given by
However, when individuals play the ultimatum game against inanimate objects such as computers, they
behave as predicted by economic theory (100-0 splits are not uncommon); for instance, see Camerer et al.
(2004).
20This is likely to arise if in an appropriately specified dynamic model, the taxpayers have hyperbolic
preferences; for instance, see Camerer et al. (2004).
21We could have posed our question in many diﬀerent, but equivalent ways. For example, given actual
(λ, p) combinations, what level of tax evasion does each theory predict?
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λEU(p) =
1− p
p
− 0.3
0.3
(5.14)
where superscript EU refers to ‘expected utility’.
5.3.1. The Prelec probability weighting function
For our calibration exercise we adopt the weighting function of Prelec22 because it is par-
simonious, consistent with much of the available empirical evidence and has an axiomatic
foundation23. The Prelec weighting function has the following form:
w+(p) = w−(p) = w(p) = e−(− ln p)
α
for p ∈ (0, 1], w (0) = 0 and 0 < α < 1. (5.15)
Note that w (p) is a strictly increasing function from [0, 1] onto [0, 1], w (0) = 0, w (1) = 1,
w (e−1) = e−1 ' 0.37, w (p) is strictly concave on (0, e−1) with w (p) > p, w (p) is strictly
convex on (e−1, 1) with w (p) < p, and w (p) is C∞ on (0, 1) (see Figure 5.1).
Using (5.11), (5.12), (5.13) and the Prelec weighting function (5.15), the (λ, p) locus
under prospect theory is given by
λPT (p) =
µ
1
2.25
¶ 1
0.88
Γ(p)
1
0.88 − 0.3
0.3
, (5.16)
where the superscript PT refers to ‘prospect theory’ and
Γ(p) = exp
£
(− ln p)0.35 − (− ln(1− p))0.35
¤
.
We have substituted the value of α = 0.35 in Γ(p). This is not restrictive; for robustness
analysis, see Section 6 below.
In Figure 5.2, the horizontal axis represents the audit probability p, and the vertical
axis represents the audit penalty, λ. Since most realistic audit probabilities are in the
22Tversky and Kahneman proposed the following probability weighting functions, for the domain of
gains and losses respectively:
w+(p) = pγ {pγ + (1− p)γ}−1/γ ; γ u 0.61.
w−(p) = pδ
n
pδ + (1− p)δ
o−1/δ
; δ u 0.69.
Camerer and Ho propose
f(p) = 1− (1− p)γ/ [pγ + (1− p)γ ]1/γ with f(0.7) u 0.7
For an application of this weighting function to tax evasion, see Bernasconi (1998). Our results, however,
do not critically depend on which probability weighting function we use.
23Prelec gives axiomatic foundations. For alternative axiomatic foundations, see Luce (2001) and al-
Nowaihi and Dhami.
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Figure 5.1: A Prelec Weighting Function for α = 0.5
range 0.01 to 0.03 the horizontal axis is shown up to a maximum value of 0.05.24 The
upper, thicker curve plots the (λ, p) locus for expected utility in (5.14) and the lower,
thinner curve plots the (λ, p) locus for prospect theory in (5.16). It is clear that the (λ, p)
locus for EUT is everywhere significantly above that for prospect theory. In Figure 5.2,
the vertical axis gives the penalty rate. Hence, a penalty rate of 50, for instance, means
that for each pound of tax evaded, the penalty is 50 pounds. Actual magnitudes of penalty
rates range from 50 pence to 2 pounds for every pound evaded.
The numerical magnitudes of (λ, p) that correspond to the two loci in the figure are
shown in the table below.
Table I: Comparison of λ Under Expected Utility and Prospect Theory
p .005 .010 .015 .020 .025 .030 .035 .040 .045 .050
λEU(p) 197.67 97.67 64.33 47.67 37.67 31.00 26.23 22.67 19.89 17.67
λPT (p) 1.55 1.21 1.00 0.86 0.75 0.66 0.58 0.52 0.46 0.41
λEU(p) and λPT (p) are the predicted penalty rates consistent for a given p and a tax
evasion rate of 30 percent under EUT and Prospect theory, respectively. For most realistic
24Here we follow Skinner and Slemrod (1985): “In 1981 a total of 2 percent of private returns were
audited in the United States. While the IRS has established elaborate methods of flagging suspicious
returns, it is unlikely that the probability of audit, p, for the amateur tax evader exceeds 5 percent
depending on the kind of evasion.” Suppose that only 2 percent of "suspicious returns" are audited. Even
if only taxes are withheld at source for 60 percent of the population (which constitutes the "non-suspicious"
returns), the eﬀective probability of audit for for the remaining 40 percent who have an opportunity to
evade is no more than 5 percent.
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Figure 5.2: λ, p values consistent with 30% tax evasion under EUT and PT.
audit probabilities (i.e. p ∈ [0.01, 0.03]), the estimate of the penalty rate ranges from 0.66
to 1.21 for Prospect Theory. This is consistent with actual values for the audit probabilities
that range from 0.5 in USA to 2.0 in Italy; see Bernasconi for these figures. On the other
hand, EUT predicts a penalty rate that is up to 100 times larger in this range and on
average about 60 times higher! The above is summarized, without proof, by the following
Proposition.
Proposition 7 For realistic magnitudes of tax evasion (approximately 30 percent) and
audit probabilities (1 to 3 percent), the penalty rate predicted by Prospect theory is 0.66
to 1.21 while that predicted by EUT is 31 to 98. The penalty rate predicted by Prospect
theory is consistent with observed rates.
This provides strong vindication for the choice of prospect theory in explaining actual
parameters of policy choice relevant for the tax evasion problem. It is remarkable that
the predicted magnitudes of (λ, p) are so close to the actually observed values when one
considers that the parameter values used for the calibration exercise were obtained from
independent experimental evidence applied to generic situations of risk.
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6. Robustness analysis
In this section we examine the sensitivity of the results to variations in the magnitude of
the weighting parameter, α, and the stigma rate, s. We also examine the implications of a
more general formulation of the stigma rate and the issue of guilt. Unlike stigma, which
arises only if the tax-evader is caught, guilt arises from the act of evasion itself, whether
the tax-evader is caught or not.
6.1. Weighting parameter α
The calibration results depend on the value of the parameter α in the Prelec weighting
function. An increase in α reduces the degree of overweighting of small probabilities. In
particular, w(p)→ p as α→ 1 (i.e., in the limit, the objective and subjective probabilities
coincide). We now examine the robustness of the results with respect to α in Figure 6.1,
which plots the λ, p locus under prospect theory, (5.16), for successive values of α = 0.3,
0.4, 0.5, 0.6. The λ, p locus shifts up monotonically as α increases (so the lowest locus
corresponds to α = 0.3 and the highest corresponds to α = 0.6).
To see if the λ, p loci are reasonable, we have drawn horizontal lines in Figure 6.1
corresponding respectively to the values λ = 0.5, λ = 2.0 and λ = 4.0. While the oﬃcial
penalty rate seems to vary between λ = 0.5 and λ = 2.0, there are other, potentially
important costs to an individual when tax evasion is discovered that increase the "eﬀective
penalty rate"25. The λ = 4.0 bound might not be unreasonable in light of these costs.
Finally, and taking the suggestion of Skinner and Slemrod, Figure 6.1 is plotted for audit
probabilities that lie between 1 to 5 percent.
It can be seen from Figure 6.1 that the λ, p loci for prospect theory lie roughly within
the expected range. Hence, while the results are sensitive to α, they are nevertheless within
reasonable bounds.
6.2. Stigma rate, s
Recall that a stigma rate from tax evasion of up to 5 times higher than the maximum
arising from receipt of welfare payments gave rise to sc = 0.30. The literature points
to low levels of stigma from evasion. For robustness purposes, suppose that we allowed
for stigma rates such that the critical value, sc, respectively halved and doubled26. It
turns out that there is only a small change in the predicted value of λ (by −0.5 and
25These costs do not have the nature of stigma costs. Of particular importance could be the possibly
high monetary costs arising on account of legal expenses. Even if one decides not to pursue the accusation
in a court, one often needs to incur the cost of legal advice to make that decision. Other, plausible costs
include the loss of income, hassle and inconvenience costs etc.
26In other words, s ∼ U [0, 0.5] and s ∼ U [0, 2.0] respectively, which implies that sc = 0.15 and sc = 0.60
respectively.
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Figure 6.1: λ, p locii under PT for α = 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6.
+0.5 respectively). Given that the predicted values of λEU are over-predicted by about
60 on average, within the relevant range of audit probabilities, this adjustment in stigma
is insuﬃcient to align the predictions of EUT with the data, but it still allows reasonably
accurate predictions using prospect theory.
6.3. Some additional issues with the rate of stigma
There are three additional issues with respect to stigma costs.
1. The Yitzhaki result applies in the absence of stigma. Proposition 1 indicates that,
under EUT and in the presence of stigma, the eﬀect of the tax rate on the amount
evaded is ambiguous. We look at the Yitzhaki result here as an empirical question.
Using (5.8) we plot, in Figure 6.2, the derivative of declared income D with respect
to the tax rate for the case of EUT. We use the values λ = 2, p = 0.3, β = 0.5, t = 0.3
for calibration purposes27. Figure 6.2 plots ∂D/∂t for a wide range of values of the
27These set of values are identical to the ones we use to calibrate the prospect theory model with the
exception of the preference parameter β. In prospect theory, β ≈ 0.88 and loss aversion performs a role
similar (but not identical) to risk aversion. However, restricting β ≈ 0.88 under EUT would imply close
to risk neutrality. Hence, we use the more realistic value of β = 0.5.
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stigma rate, namely, s ∈ [0, 2]. It is clear that for realistic parameter values, the
Yitzhaki puzzle survives the introduction of stigma under EUT because ∂D/∂t > 0
(although ∂2D/∂t2 < 0).
21.510.50
5
3.75
2.5
1.25
0
s
dD/dt
Figure 6.2: The derivative of declared income with respect to the tax rate
2. In the main paper, we follow the original treatment of stigma in Gordon and specify
the loss due to stigma as s (W −D). Does this play a role in allowing us to overturn
the Yitzhaki result under prospect theory? To examine this let us specify a more
general form of the loss due to stigma. It is often argued that stigma costs are lower
when the tax rate is high or the tax system is perceived as being unfair; for example,
see Gordon (1989) and Brooks (2001). This suggests that in practice, stigma costs
are given by
ψ(t) (W −D) (6.1)
where ψ(t) is a function that depends on the tax rate and satisfies the restriction
ψ0(t) ≤ 0. (6.2)
With costs of stigma formulated as in (6.1) and (6.2), it is easy to check that the
equilibrium condition under prospect theory, the analogue of (5.11), becomes
Case : I D = 0 if
¡
1
θ
¢ w+(1−p)
w−(p) >
³
λ+ ψ(t)t
´β
Case : II D ∈ [0,W ] if
¡
1
θ
¢ w+(1−p)
w−(p) =
³
λ+ ψ(t)t
´β
Case : III D = W if
¡
1
θ
¢ w+(1−p)
w−(p) <
³
λ + ψ(t)t
´β
.
(6.3)
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From (6.3), an increase in the tax rate is more conducive for case III as compared to
case I (a necessary condition for the Yitzhaki puzzle to be overturned) if
d
dt
µ
ψ(t)
t
¶
≤ 0. (6.4)
It is immediately clear that a suﬃcient condition for (6.4) to hold is given in (6.2),
which was a-priori the preferred restriction. In the main body of the paper we use
ψ(t) = s, where s is a constant; this satisfies (6.2). Hence, more general formulations
of stigma using prospect theory also refute the Yitzhaki result.
3. Stigma needs to be separated from guilt28. One might feel guilty about evading taxes
even if "not caught" by the tax authorities. We illustrate the issues in the context
of a fixed probability of detection. Suppose that in addition to the usual penalties
levied by the government the taxpayer also suﬀers from guilt g(W −D), where g > 0
is the guilt costs arising from a dollar of tax evaded. Proceeding in the usual way
we can check that the value function under prospect theory is now given by
V (D; t, s, λ, θ, g,W ) = (W −D)β h (t, s, λ, θ, g) (6.5)
where
h (t, s, λ, θ, g) = (t− g)β
"
w+ (1− p)− θ
µ
λt+ g + s
t− g
¶β
w− (p)
#
. (6.6)
The decision criteria of the taxpayer is given by (5.11) except that the value of h(.)
is replaced by that given in (6.6). Restricting to real valued functions (so t > g),
an increase in the tax rate increases h (t, s, λ, θ, g). Using (5.11), this is a necessary
condition to move from D = W (Case-III) to D = 0 (Case-I), which runs counter
to Yitzhaki’s result as claimed earlier. Proceeding analogously it is easy to check
that an increase in guilt cost per dollar, g, lowers h (t, s, λ, θ, g), which is a necessary
condition to move from D = 0 (Case-I) to D = W (Case-III) (i.e. an increase in
guilt lowers evasion). The comparative static results with respect to other parameters
such as θ can also be checked to hold. Hence, the presence of guilt does not alter our
results. It is straightforward to check that the qualitative comparative static eﬀects
of stigma costs are unaltered.
7. Conclusions
Why should people pay taxes when, given relatively low audit probabilities and penalties,
evasion should be extremely attractive, at least to expected utility maximizers? This is
28We are grateful to a referee for pointing this out.
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puzzling, given “too much observed compliance” relative to the predictions of expected
utility theory. This paper considers an alternative theoretical model that is based on cu-
mulative prospect theory. Prospect theory characterizes individuals as loss averse with
respect to some reference income. Furthermore, these individuals overweight small prob-
abilities while underweighting large ones.
Our results show that despite the existence of low audit probabilities and penalty rates
in actual practice, the magnitude of tax evasion predicted by prospect theory is consistent
with the data. Individuals are also predicted to respond to an increase in the tax rate by
increasing the amount evaded. This accords with the bulk of the evidence, but contrasts
with the converse prediction made by expected utility theory. These considerations would,
to our mind, suggest that an increased use be made of prospect theory in formulating tax
evasion problems.29
In applying prospect theory, we do not fix the parameter values of the model to make
it fit the evidence on tax evasion. Instead, we use the parameters of human choice that
are revealed from independent experimental evidence. When such parameters are not
available we conduct a robustness analysis. Prospect theory is able to explain the tax
evasion puzzles. Hence, the paper concludes that the behavior of tax payers provides
strong support for prospect theory.
8. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1From (2.1), (2.2) and (3.1) we get
∂U
∂D
= (s+ λt) pu0 (YC)− t (1− p)u0 (YNC)− p0 [u (YNC)− u (YC)] (8.1)
∂2U
∂D2
= p00 [u (YC)− u (YNC)] + 2 (s+ λt) p0u0 (YC) + 2tp0u0 (YNC)
+ (s+ λt)2 pu00 (YC) + t2 (1− p) u00 (YNC) (8.2)
∂2U
∂D∂s
= pu0 (YC)− (s+ λt) (W −D) pu00 (YC)− (W −D) p0u0 (YC) > 0 (8.3)
∂2U
∂D∂λ
= tpu0 (YC)− t (s+ λt) pu00 (YC) (W −D)− t (W −D) p0u0 (YC) > 0 (8.4)
29Kanbur et al. (2004) set out the restrictions necessary for the first order approach of principal-agent
theory to hold in a prospect theory analysis of optimal taxation with moral hazard but without tax
evasion. Their usage of prospect theory relies mainly on reference dependence and loss aversion. Dhami
and al-Nowaihi incorporate all three components (i.e. reference dependence, loss aversion and non-linear
weighting of probabilities), in an optimal tax analysis in the presence of tax evasion. The latter’s simulation
shows that the revenue maximizing tax rate is approximately 33 percent, which is not unrepresentative of
Western democracies.
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∂2U
∂D∂t
= {λp+ [W + λ (W −D)] [(s+ λt) pA (YC)− p0]} u0 (YC)
− {(1− p) [1 + tDA (YNC)]−Dp0} u0 (YNC) (8.5)
where A (Y ) = −u00 (Y ) /u0 (Y ) is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion. All terms in
(8.2) are negative except, possibly, the first. If p00 (D) ≥ 0, then the first term will be
non-positive. Hence p00 (D) ≥ 0 is suﬃcient, but not necessary, for ∂2U∂D2 to be negative.
Let D∗ (t, s, λ,W ) maximize the taxpayer’s expected utility (3.1) given the values of
the parameters t, s, λ,W .
(a) Consider an interior maximum (i.e., 0 < D∗ < W ). Hence, at D = D∗, ∂U∂D = 0 and
∂2U
∂D2 ≤ 0. If
∂2U
∂D2 = 0, then D
∗ is a critical point of ∂U∂D . If
∂2U
∂D2 6= 0, then D∗ is a regular
point of ∂U∂D . Assume D
∗ is a regular point; then ∂
2U
∂D2 < 0 at D = D
∗. Hence, from the
implicit function theorem, D∗ (t, s, λ,W ) is unique, continuously diﬀerentiable with
∂D∗
∂s
= − ∂
2U
∂D∂s
/
∂2U
∂D2
;
∂D∗
∂λ
= − ∂
2U
∂D∂λ
/
∂2U
∂D2
;
∂D∗
∂t
= − ∂
2U
∂D∂t
/
∂2U
∂D2
,
at least locally. It follows that the signs of ∂D
∗
∂s ,
∂D∗
∂λ and
∂D∗
∂t are those of
∂2U
∂D∂s ,
∂2U
∂D∂λ and
∂2U
∂D∂t , respectively. It then follows from (8.3) and (8.4) that
∂D∗
∂s > 0 and
∂D∗
∂λ > 0.
(b) Assume the maximum lies on the boundary. If D∗ is on the lower boundary (i.e.,
D∗ = 0), then, clearly, D∗ is non-decreasing. Suppose D∗ is on the upper boundary (i.e.,
D∗ =W ). Then, at D = D∗, ∂U∂D ≥ 0, but from (8.3) and (8.4), we see that
∂U
∂D is a strictly
increasing function of each of s and λ. Hence an increase in either s or λ will make ∂U∂D
strictly positive. Thus a reduction in D would reduce welfare. Hence, D∗ cannot decrease
as a result of an increase in either s or λ.
(c) The first term of (8.5) is positive but the second is negative. Hence, ∂D
∗
∂t is ambigu-
ous. QED.
Proof of Proposition 2Set p00 (D) = p0 (D) = 0 and s = 0 in (8.1), (8.2) and (8.5) to
get
∂U
∂D
= λtpu0 (YC)− t (1− p) u0 (YNC) (8.6)
∂2U
∂D2
= λ2t2pu00 (YC) + t2 (1− p) u00 (YNC) < 0 (8.7)
∂2U
∂D∂t
= λp {1 + t [W + λ (W −D)]A (YC)}u0 (YC)
− (1− p) [1 + tDA (YNC)] u0 (YNC) . (8.8)
(a) Consider an interior maximum (i.e., 0 < D∗ < W ). Hence, at D = D∗, ∂U∂D = 0.
Set ∂U∂D = 0 in (8.6) to get
1− p = λpu
0 (YC)
u0 (YNC)
. (8.9)
24
Page 25 of 30 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Substitute from (8.9) into (8.8) to get
∂2U
∂D∂t
= λtpu0 (YC) {(1 + λ) (W −D)A (YC) +D [A (YC)− A (YNC)]} . (8.10)
Assuming non-increasing absolute risk aversion gives A (YC) ≥ A (YNC). It follows from
(8.10) that ∂
2U
∂D∂t > 0. Hence, and in the light of (8.7),
∂D∗
∂t > 0.
(b) Assume the maximum lies on the boundary. If D∗ is on the lower boundary (i.e.,
D∗ = 0), then, clearly, D∗ is non-decreasing. Suppose D∗ is on the upper boundary (i.e.,
D∗ =W ), then, at D = D∗ =W , ∂U∂D ≥ 0. Hence, from (8.6)
1− p ≤ λpu
0 (YC)
u0 (YNC)
. (8.11)
From (8.8) and (8.11) we get
∂2U
∂D∂t
≥ λtpWu0 (YC) [A (YC)− A (YNC)] > 0. (8.12)
From (8.12), we see that ∂U∂D is a strictly increasing function of t. Hence an increase in t
will make ∂U∂D strictly positive. Thus a reduction in D would reduce welfare. Hence, D
∗
cannot decrease as a result of an increase in t. QED.
Proof of Proposition 3From (2.1), (2.2) and (4.1) we get
XNC = W − tD −R, 0 ≤ D ≤W (8.13)
XC = (1− t)W − (s+ λt) (W −D)−R, 0 ≤ D ≤W. (8.14)
For the taxpayer always to be in the domain of gains if not caught, we must have
XNC ≥ 0 for all D ∈ [0,W ] . (8.15)
Similarly, for the taxpayer always to be in the domain of losses if caught, we must have
XC ≤ 0 for all D ∈ [0,W ] . (8.16)
In particular, for D = W , (8.13) and (8.15) give30
R ≤ (1− t)W. (8.17)
30Note that (8.13)-(8.16), must hold for any D ∈ [0,W ]; hence, we get that the reference point must
satisfy
R ∈ [W − tD − [s+ t(1 + λ)] (W −D) ,W − tD] ≡ [A,B]
where A and B are respectively the lower and upper limits of the interval. Notice that dAdD = s+ tλ > 0
and dBdD = −t < 0. Hence, as one moves from D = 0 to D = W one gets nested intervals within which R
must lie. Since D ∈ [0,W ] we need only check the case D = W to ensure that the reference point holds
for all possible values of D.
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Similarly, for D =W , (8.14) and (8.16) give
R ≥ (1− t)W. (8.18)
From (8.17) and (8.18) we get R = (1− t)W as the unique reference point. QED.
Proof of Proposition 4From (4.7) we get
∂V
∂D
= (W −D)β−1
½
θ (s+ λt)β
£
βw− − (W −D) (w−)0 p0
¤
−tβ
£
βw+ + (W −D) (w+)0 p0
¤ ¾ (8.19)
∂2V
∂D2
= 2β (W −D)β−1
h
tβ
¡
w+
¢0
+ θ (s+ λt)β
¡
w−
¢0i
p0
+β (1− β) (W −D)β−2
h
θ (s+ λt)β w− − tβw+
i
+(W −D)β
h
tβ
¡
w+
¢00 − θ (s+ λt)β ¡w−¢00i (p0)2
− (W −D)β
h
tβ
¡
w+
¢0
+ θ (s+ λt)β
¡
w−
¢0i
p00 (8.20)
∂2V
∂D∂θ
= β (s+ λt)β (W −D)β−1w− − (s+ λt)β (W −D)β
¡
w−
¢0
p0 > 0 (8.21)
∂2V
∂D∂s
= β2θ (s+ λt)β−1 (W −D)β−1w− − βθ (s+ λt)β−1 (W −D)β
¡
w−
¢0
p0 > 0 (8.22)
∂2V
∂D∂λ
= β2θt (s+ λt)β−1 (W −D)β−1w−−βθt (s+ λt)β−1 (W −D)β
¡
w−
¢0
p0 > 0 (8.23)
∂2V
∂D∂t
= β (W −D)β−1
½
λθ (s+ λt)β−1
£
βw− − (W −D) (w−)0 p0
¤
−tβ−1
£
βw+ + (W −D) (w+)0 p0
¤ ¾ (8.24)
where w− is evaluated at p (D) and w+ is evaluated at 1− p (D).
Note that the first term in (8.20) is negative. However, the other three terms are
ambiguous. Hence, the sign of ∂
2V
∂D2 is ambiguous.
Let D∗ (t, s, λ, θ,W ) maximize (4.7) given the values of the parameters t, s, λ, θ,W .
(a) Consider an interior maximum (i.e., 0 < D∗ < W ). Hence, at D = D∗, ∂U∂D = 0.
Set ∂U∂D = 0 in (8.19) to get
tβ−1
h
βw+ + (W −D)
¡
w+
¢0
p0
i
= t−1θ (s+ λt)β
h
βw− − (W −D)
¡
w−
¢0
p0
i
. (8.25)
From (8.24) and (8.25) we get
∂2V
∂D∂t
= −βθs (s+ λt)
β−1
t (W −D)1−β
h
βw− − (W −D)
¡
w−
¢0
p0
i
< 0. (8.26)
Since β > 0, w− > 0, W ≥ D, p0 ≤ 0, (w−)0 > 0, it follows that βw−− (W −D) (w−)0 p0 >
0. Hence, from (8.26), it is clear that ∂
2V
∂D∂t (D; t, s, λ, θ,W ) < 0.
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If ∂
2V
∂D2 = 0, then D
∗ is a critical point of ∂V∂D . If
∂2V
∂D2 6= 0, then D∗ is a regular point
of ∂V∂D . Assume D
∗ is a regular point; then ∂
2V
∂D2 < 0 at D = D
∗. Hence, from the implicit
function theorem, D∗ (t, s, λ, θ,W ) is unique, continuously diﬀerentiable with
∂D∗
∂θ
= − ∂
2V
∂D∂θ
/
∂2V
∂D2
;
∂D∗
∂s
= − ∂
2V
∂D∂s
/
∂2V
∂D2
;
∂D∗
∂λ
= − ∂
2V
∂D∂λ
/
∂2V
∂D2
;
∂D∗
∂t
= − ∂
2V
∂D∂t
/
∂2V
∂D2
,
at least locally. It follows that the signs of ∂D
∗
∂θ ,
∂D∗
∂s ,
∂D∗
∂λ and
∂D∗
∂t are those of
∂2V
∂D∂θ ,
∂2V
∂D∂s ,
∂2V
∂D∂λ and
∂2V
∂D∂t , respectively. It then follows from (8.21), (8.22), (8.23) and (8.26) that
∂D∗
∂θ > 0,
∂D∗
∂s > 0,
∂D∗
∂λ > 0 and
∂D∗
∂t < 0.
(b) Assume the maximum lies on the boundary. If D∗ is on the upper boundary (i.e.,
D∗ = W ), then, clearly, D∗ is non-increasing function of t. Suppose D∗ is on the lower
boundary (i.e., D∗ = 0). Then, at D = D∗ = 0, ∂V∂D ≤ 0. Hence, from (8.19), we get
tβ−1
h
βw+ +W
¡
w+
¢0
p0
i
≥ t−1θ (s+ λt)β
h
βw− −W
¡
w−
¢0
p0
i
. (8.27)
From (8.24) and (8.27) we get
∂2V
∂D∂t
≤ −βθs (s+ λt)
β−1
tW 1−β
h
βw− −W
¡
w−
¢0
p0
i
< 0, (8.28)
but from (8.28), we see that ∂V∂D is a strictly decreasing function of t. Hence an increase in
t will make ∂V∂D strictly negative. Thus an increase in D would reduce welfare. Hence, D
∗
cannot increase as a result of an increase in t.
A similar argument shows that D∗ is non-decreasing function of each of s, λ and θ.
QED.
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